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JUVENILE JUSTICE




Appeals were allowed in the first juvenile court set up in
Chicago in 1899, and were incorporated in the juvenile court laws
which followed all over the country in the first years of this cen-
tury. As the appreciation of the philosophy underlying juvenile
court procedure grew, however, resort to a higher court was grad-
ually curtailed until in recent years juvenile court laws in eight
jurisdictions make no provision for appeal or re-hearing.' The
reason for this development, as has been well set forth in several
key cases,; is that the juvenile process exists for the guidance of
children, and their treatment by a tribunal which represents the
State as parens patriae. There is no desire or authority to visit
punishment or vengeance as upon one who has violated the crim-
inal law, but rather an interest inherent in the children's code to
protect, at the same time, society and the future of the minor by
his proper treatment. Where a juvenile hearing is not a trial for
an offense, but an ascertainment of the statutory ground for action
by the State, failure to provide for appeal is no denial of any civil
liberty nor violation of any constitutional right.3
Since 1906, Massachusetts has held to the view that a juvenile
is as much entitled to an appeal from either adjudication or dis-
position as an adult is from his sentence in a lower court.4 While
the probate courts of Massachusetts have always been of superior
* Massachusetts Child Council, Boston.
1'ller, Francis H., Juvenile Court Laws of the United States, New York
National Probation Association, 1933.
2 The right of appeal is unknown at common law, and is merely a creation of
statute. It is not a constitutional right and is wholly within the power of the
legislature to grant or deny. 17 St. Louis L. R. 89; 27 Columbia L. R. 968; ex
parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123, 1911; Wissenburg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 229
N. W. 205, 1929; Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 106, 133 S. W. 1137; Wharton's
Criminal Law, 12th ed., 1932, Vol. I, Sec. 373.
3 Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70. Cf. Bryant v. Brown (1928) 151 Miss. 398,
118 So. 184, 60 A. L. R. 1325; In re Broughton (1916) 192 Mich. 418, 158 N. W. 884;
27 Col. L. R. 968; 86 A. L. R. 1009, 1932.
4 Mass. General Laws, Chapter 119, Section 56.
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jurisdiction, and the juvenile courts stand next to them in the
guidance of minors for the welfare of society, nevertheless the
juvenile courts have never been granted the same superior status.
In fact, the law clearly gives to the child the right of appeal at the
time of adjudication and upon disposition, and enjoins the court to
inform him of this right at both of these steps in the proceedings.
The preamble to the Massachusetts juvenile court law is one of
the finest in the literature of children's codes---". . . the care, cus-
tody and discipline of the children brought before the court shall
approximate as nearly as possible that which they should receive
from their parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be
treated, not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encourage-
ment and guidance." 5 It is difficult to reconcile so fine a purpose
with the limiting proviso, three sections later, which hamstrings the
court in its attempt to deal with children as the preamble would
allow, by setting out with great care the manner in which a juvenile
may resist such treatment.
The law of 1916 which came out of an investigation into the
results of ten years' operation of the juvenile court law,e attempted
to remedy some of the defects in the juvenile appeal procedure by
requiring for juveniles in the Superior Court a separate session,
trial list and docket. It abolished the extensive use of the not pros
by requiring that all juvenile appeals be tried, unless otherwise
disposed of by direct order of the court, and, to provide a certain
continuity, specified that the lower court supply the Superior Court
with a copy of its investigation.
The Children's Commission in 1931 attempted still further to
scale down the adult criminalistic manner in which juvenile appeals
were handled by urging that appeals be allowed solely from adju-
dication; if the adjudication of delinquency were affirmed in the
Superior Court, the child would be returned to the juvenile court
for treatment or disposition.7
This proposed law was not enacted, and so there stand now
upon the statute books of the Commonwealth two conflicting sec-
tions-one which states the purpose of the juvenile court to be
paternal and benevolent, wherein the proceedings shall not be
Ibid., Section 53.
Acts of 1916, Chapter 243, Section 1. Cf. Report of the Commission on Pro-
bation Relative to the Juvenile Law, 1916, Mass. Senate No. 330, pp. 7-8, 29-32,
40-1.
7 Report of the Special Commission to Investigate the Laws Relative to.
Dependent, Delinquent and Neglected Children, 1931, Mass. House No. 1200 esp.
pp. 45-6, 190-1.
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deemed criminal, and another which insists on giving the child ("in
like manner as appeals in criminal cases") two means of escape
from this kindly treatment-at the time of adjudication and when
disposition is made." While a juvenile case originates on the equity
side of the lower court, these provisions for appeal result in throw-
ing the case over on to the criminal side of the upper court. This
is a distortion of the underlying basis of juvenile court jurisdiction.'
In view of the conflict in the laws governing juvenile appeal,
this study was undertaken to discover the actual operation of the
appeal procedure in Massachusetts. The literature gives scant at-
tention to this phase of the juvenile court problem. Those juris-
dictions which may be contemplating an examination or revision
of their juvenile appeal process, may be encouraged to do so by
the findings of this study.
The method, briefly, was as follows: Suffolk County, compris-
ing the cities of Boston, Revere and Chelsea and the town of Win-
throp, was chosen for an examination of the juveniles who appealed
to the Superior Court between April 15, 1930, and April 15, 1935.
The dates were set by taking the last appeal case disposed of by the
Suffolk Superior Court, and then working back over a five-year
period. The cases entered in the juvenile docket of the Suffolk
Superior Court were taken down on preliminary work sheets, with
sufficient identifying data to allow them to be run through the
records of the Board of Probation for such information as age and
residence. From these records, eighteen appeal cases were dis-
covered which had not been entered in the juvenile docket, as the
law requires. A statistical code sheet was then drawn off for each
case, and filled out from the court papers on file in the clerk's office.
The records of the Sheriff's office at the Suffolk County Jail sup-
plied data on jail detention. The records in the Superior Court
probation office were consulted in an attempt to learn how much
information was forwarded by the lower court.
The offense code was taken, with some necessary modifications,
from the classification in use by the Board of Probation. The
8 Adjudication is comparable to a finding of guilt or innocence in the criminal
court; an adjudication of delinquency or waywardness must precede any dis-
position by the juvenile court.
0 "The courts of equity in their capacity of agencies through which the
sovereign, as parens patriae, exercised his supervision over infants, idiots, lunatics,
and other incapables, originally had immediate jurisdiction over these abnormal
persons also. In modern practice, this jurisdiction is generally lodged in probate
courts, and other minor tribunals having special equity powers, with an appellate
jurisdiction in the higher equity courts." (Robinson, William C., Elementary
Law, Boston, 1910, p. 406.)
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principles which S. B. Warner advances, 10 governed the choice of
the offense to be tabulated in those cases where more than one viola-
tion was charged against the appellant. After this process had been
completed for each case, and the code sheets filled in, individual
statistical cards were then punched and tabulated.
B. Characterstics-Age-Court-Residence
During the five year period covered by this study, 415 juveniles
appealed to the Suffolk Superior Court from the Boston Juvenile
Court, the juvenile sessions of the Municipal Courts of Roxbury,
South Boston, Charlestown, West Roxbury, Dorchester, Brighton,
and the juvenile sessions of the District Courts of East Boston and
Chelsea. Of these 415 appeals, 167 (40.2%) were from adjudication
and 248 (59.8%) were from disposition. Of the total group of
appeals, 38 (9.2%) were girls and 377 (90.8%) were boys. The
average age of the group was fourteen years eight months.
A comparison of the courts in Suffolk County handling juvenile
cases reveals that the lowest percentage of appeals-1.2 %-is taken
from the dispositions of the Boston Juvenile Court, the only court
of the nine under consideration which devotes full and specialized
attention to juvenile business. The Boston Juvenile Court disposed
of 39.2% of the juvenile cases in the county with only 12.2% of the
total appeals; the other eight courts handled 60.8% of the juvenile
cases in the county, yet they were responsible for 87.8% of the
total appeals. The court which devotes full time and attention to
juvenile business has fewest exceptions taken to its decisions. The
other courts report nearly three times as high a percentage ,of
appeals, and one court, Chelsea, records 12.4% appealed from all
its juvenile dispositions.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the 415 appeals discovered by
this study, for the court and year in which they originated, and the
percentage each court had of the total number of appeals.
Viewed here, without regard to the number of dispositions,
there is little uniformity in the percentage of the total appeals con-
tributed by each of the eight juvenile sessions and the Boston
Juvenile Court. The Chelsea Court is again highest, with 76 cases
(18.3% of the total) and the Brighton Court is lowest with 9 cases
1 "1. Where any person is prosecuted ... for several offenses, select for
tabulation the offense for which proceedings were carried furthest. 2. If the
defendant was convicted of several offenses, select the one for which the heaviest
punishment was awarded." Crime and Criminal Statistics in Boston, Harvard
Law School Survey of Crime in Boston, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1934, p. 103.
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TABLE 1
COURT IN WHICH JuvENILE APPEALS WERE ENTERED, 1931-1935, INCLUSIVE
Court Year
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 Total Per Cant
Boston Juvenile ............ 18 16 3 3 9 49 11.8
Roxbury .................... 11 9 9 4 12 45 10.8
South Boston ............... 4 7 11 10 13 45 10.8
Charlestown ................ 7 7 - 6 13 33 8.0
East Boston ................ 8 15 10 7 6 46 11.1
West Roxbury .............. 9 16 8 6 7 46 11.1
Dorchester .................. 23 10 9 14 10 66 15.9
Brighton .................... - 5 - 2 2 9 2.2
Chelsea ..................... 16 14 18 14 14 76 18.3
TOTAL ................... 96 99 68 66 86 415 100.0
PER CENT ............. 23.1 23.9 16.4 15.9 20.7 100.0
(2.2%). While it has been stated above that the only specialized
court for dealing with juveniles returns the lowest percentage of
appeals from dispositions, it is not possible, without reference to
descriptive or subjective ratings, to appraise the other courts in
the order of their adherence to the best juvenile court standards.
The Department of Correction reports a total of 628 juvenile
commitment orders made in the county over the five year period;
this study found that appeals from such orders totalled 216 (34.4%).
Despite the different sources for these two figures, it may be as-
sumed as representative that fully one-third of the juvenile com-
mitment orders are thus appealed. This casts a serious light on the
institution of appeals, because commitment is the most drastic order
of the court; any attempt on the part of a lower court judge to deal
adequately with a case before him must be hindered by the realiza-
tion that a commitment order, made in the best interest of the child,
will be appealed in one case out of three. This fact takes on in-
creased significance when the commitment rate of the Superior
Court is examined in a later section.11
Boston is the only city of its size in the United States which
divides its juvenile court work among a group of district courts.
Eighteen other large cities1 "- have long since established county-wide
11 Cf. Section F, infra.
12 New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Los Angeles, Cleveland, St. Louis,
Baltimore, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Milwaukee, Buffalo, Washington, Minne-
apolis, New Orleans, Cincinnati, Newark, and Kansas City. Directory of Pro-
bation Officers, New York, National Probation Association, 1934.
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juvenile courts with sole jurisdiction over children's cases. Opposi-
tion to such centralization in Boston is based usually on the argu-
ment that localization of court facilities allows the judge and his staff
to act on their intimate acquaintance with the families and condi-
tions in a particular neighborhood. Such acquaintance, it is urged,
cannot be had in any way other than by locating the court in the
district. This argument is more than answered by the superior fa-
cilities for investigation, study, and treatment afforded by the larger
single court unit, and the uniformity in treatment which is thus as-
sured all cases coming to the attention of the court. Further evidence
is also adduced by Table 2 which compares the residence of the
child who appealed his case, with the location of the court which
heard his case. Fuller figures are unfortunately lacking to make
possible similar comparisons of all cases heard in the juvenile ses-
sions, but this sampling of appealed cases will throw some light on
similar conditions which undoubtedly exist in all juvenile cases,
whether appealed or not.
TABLE 2
COURT in WHICH APPEAL WAS ENTEm RELATED TO RESiDENCE OF THE JuvEI-*
Residence
.22
14 .22o -'5 :
Cour M 4 o U 0 EN
Boston Juvenile...24 3 8 3 2 1 2 .- 1 4 1 49
Roxbury .......... 1 29 3 - 1 1 8 2 45
South Boston ..... 1 1 3f - 3- - 1- 45
Charlestown ...... I 28 -- 1 - 2 1 -- 33
East Boston ....... 44 1 - 1 46
West Roxbury....- 6 2 - - 32 5- 1 - 46
Dorchester ........ - 8 5 - - 1 51 1 - 66
Brighton .................. .... 1 6 - 2 - 9
Chelsea ...........- - 1 5 -- 62 8 - 76
TOTAL ......... 27 47 57 32 52 35 71 8 66 18 2 415
PER CET ...... 6.5 11.3 13.8 7.7 12.5 8.4 17.2 1.9 15.9 4.3 .5 100.0
* Residence was taken from the records of the Board of Probation. Where
the district was not given, it was determined by reference to the Boston Directory.
** Includes Revere, as Revere is within the jurisdiction of the Chelsea Court.
t Includes Brookline, Somerville, Lynn, Cambridge, Medfield, Arlington and
Everett.
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The most conspicuous fact here revealed is that by no means
do all the children coming before any one of the nine courts reside
exclusively within the district over which the court has jurisdiction.
The Boston Juvenile Court, for example, heard only 24 cases resi-
dent in Boston proper out of a total of 49 cases (49.0%) appealed;
the Roxbury Court heard only 29 cases resident in Roxbury out of
a total of 45 cases appealed (64.4%). The other courts confined
their attention more exclusively to children resident within the
area of their jurisdiction, but for the total of 415 cases, 100 exactly
were heard in courts which, presumably, were not familiar with
the environment in which their children resided. There is no rea-
son to allow a court to proceed on a parochial residential basis when
in one-quarter of the cases here studied the very basis on which
they claim their right is lacking. The residential argument is not
upheld if examination is made of the domicile of the judges who
are supposed to temper their administration with a knowledge
gained from living within the jurisdiction of their court. Ten of the
thirty justices and special justices of the nine courts under con-
sideration live outside their judicial districts.'"
Nor does this argument hold when we consider that 20 cases
(4.8%) were those of children who lived entirely beyond Suffolk-
18 outside the county and 2 outside the State. Determination of
the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of the place of occurrence
of the offense rather than on the basis of the residence of the
offender, is borrowed, along with the right of appeal and other
features of the present administration of juvenile cases, from the
adult criminal code. Offense is of importance in understanding or
treating a child, only as a symptom or index of a need. Place of
occurrence of offense is comparatively unimportant as an aid in
understanding the child, whereas his residence, which includes his
home and environment, must be taken into consideration in any
plan of study or treatment, and should therefore be the basis of the
jurisdiction of the court.
C. Lower Court Disposition-Offense-Age
The offenses which are here recorded are probably not the first
which members of this group have committed, nor the first on which
they have been brought into court and appealed. 14 While no attempt
"As listed in the Manual for the General Court, 1935-36, Boston, 1935, and
the Boston Directory.
14 One instance discovered in the course of this study was that of a girl who
in September. 1924, at the age of eight years, appealed from an adjudication of
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was made in this study to uncover the previous conduct of these
children, or to trace their subsequent careers, it is undoubtedly true
that they are a selected group in that they have carried their cases
to the upper court. It is not possible to compare the offenses of the
appeal group with those committed by all juveniles coming before
the Suffolk courts because, with the exception of the Boston Juve-
nile Court, juvenile offenses are not tabulated. Table 3 considers
the relationship between the offense with which the child was
charged and the disposition made by the lower court from which
appeal was taken.
First for consideration is the fact that two-fifths (40.7%) ap-
pealed from adjudication, somewhat over one-half from commit-
ment (52.1%) and less than one-tenth (7.2%) from fine. It is im-
possible to state what disposition might have followed the adjudica-
tion of delinquency if it had not been appealed. Adjudication by
itself was evidently sufficiently disturbing to cause the child to
appeal the finding without waiting for the disposition which might
be imposed.
It is not clear why the juvenile court rather than a domestic
relations session should be called on to adjudicate a case of ille-
gitimacy. In ten jurisdictions throughout the country juvenile
courts are charged with the responsibility for determination of
paternity and the support of children born out of wedlock.'15 But
their interest in the offender relates to the life of the child which has
been born. Here, however, it is the offense which led to illegitimacy
that activates the court's interest in the juvenile. Included in these
three appeals from adjudication of paternity was one labeled "Ad-
judged the father of a child and Shirley." The appeal in this case
is considered as from adjudication rather than from disposition
because the Massachusetts illegitimacy laws provide that adjudica-
tion of paternity only may be appealed; if appeal is not thus taken,
no protest may lie against the order which the court may then or
later make.' 6
The group of 30 appeals (7.2%) from fines in the lower court
delinquency which was "placed on file without plea" by the Superior Court.
In August, 1931, age fifteen years, her case was "nol prossed" by the Superior
Court. Ten months after this appearance in Suffolk Superior Court she was
sentenced to Sherborn Reformatory on a charge of being idle and disorderly.
'-Illinois, New York (County Children's Courts and City of Syracuse), New
Jersey, North Carolina (Mecklemburg County), Ohio, South Carolina (counties
85,000 to 100,000), Tennessee (Union County), Wisconsin (Milwaukee County),
District of Columbia, and Hawaii. Hiller, Francis H., op. cit., page 36.
I Mass. General Laws, Chapter 273, Section 12.
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1 2 3 .7
1 .2
3 60 121 21 61 4 1 2 22 53415
.7 14.4 29.2 5.1 1.5 .2 1.0 .2 .5 5.3 1.2 .7 100.0
Total .......... 40.7% 52.1%
100.0%
represents a protest against a total sum of $860.00 imposed, an
average fine of somewhat less than twenty-nine dollars. While the
Massachusetts law allows juveniles to be fined or to make restitu-
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tion,17 this practice is not favored by leading juvenile court authori-
ties, because, except where there is some assurance that the child
may profit from the discipline of being deprived, the burden falls
rather upon his parent than upon him. 8 How deterrent such treat-
ment is may be judged from the case of one juvenile who, despite
frequent previous fines, was in court for his thirty-second consecu-
tive peddling offense.
It is natural that order of commitment should be the largest single
group of dispositions from which appeal was taken. Appeals from
commitment to Shirley are the most numerous in the institutions
group; this is largely explained by the finding that the modal age
of this group is the first half of the sixteenth year. Orders of
commitment are chiefly for those offenses which may be considered
more serious.19 The property crimes, breaking and entering, lar-
ceny, violation of the motor vehicle laws (chiefly using an auto
without authority) are in the main punished by commitment to the
reform schools. We note, further, one commitment to the House
of Correction for an offense of abduction and four commitments to
the Massachusetts Reformatory, two for breaking and entering, one
for disorderly conduct and one for operating an auto without
authority.
All six commitments to the Middlesex County Training School
were for some violation of the school law, chiefly truancy, despite
the present commonly held opinion that truancy is frequently
symptomatic of a maladjustment expressed in, but not necessarily
originating in the school classroom. 20 The fact that truancy is not
so treated by the Suffolk courts is further borne out by this same
table-the other three school offenders were ordered committed
to the state or city child placing divisions.
These latter three placement commitments were all of girls.
While the number of girls in this sample is low, and conclusions
regarding them should therefore be carefully drawn, a comparison
17 Ibid., Chapter 119, Sections 59, 62.
18 Lou, H. H., Juvenile Courts in the United States, Chapel Hill, 1927, pp. 146-7.
'9 Glueck, Sheldon and Eleanor T., 500 Criminal Careers, New York, 1930,
pp. 141, 354-357.
20 Cf., among others: Bowler, A. C. and Bloodgood, R. S., Institutional Treat-
ment of Delinquent Boys, Part 2-A Study of 751 Boys, Washington, Children's
Bureau Publication No. 230, 1936, pp. 28 and 29; Howard, F. E. and Patry, F. L.,
Mental Health, New York, 1935, p. 309; White House Conference on Child Health
and Protection, New York, 1933, Section IV, The Delinquent Child, pp. 38-41,
Section I, The Child and the School, pp. 108-112; Shaw, C. R., Delinquency Area,
Chicago, 1929, p. 33, et seq.; Abbott, J. and Breckenridge, S. P., Truancy and
Non-Attendance in the Chicago Schools, Chicago, 1917, p. 227.
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of the dispositions from which the 377 boys and 38 girls appealed
shows that the former were fined more often than were the girls
(7.4% to 2.6%) while the commitment rate of the girls is, as usual,2 1
higher than for the boys (63.2% to 41.4%). The reason for this is
probably found in the fact that boys commit a larger proportion of
property than sex offenses, while the very opposite is true for the
girls.22 Of 377 boys who appealed, 8 (2.1%) were charged with
sex offenses; of 38 girls who appealed, 15 (39.5%) were similarly
charged. The need is evident for a more varied and individualized
dealing with the problems presented by girls than that expressed
here by a high commitment rate.
TABLE 4
AGE AT THE Tixm OF DISPOSITION BY THE LowER CounT
Age in Years Per
Disposition 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Totals Cent
Adjudi- Delinquency ........... 4 5 6 13 16 18 36 34 34 166 169 40.7
cation Paternity ............... 1 1 1 3
Lyman ................. 1 2 6 4 6 7 23 11 60
Shirley ................. 6 46 69 121
Com- Lancaster ............... 2 1 2 3 5 8 21
mit- Mid. Cty. Tr. School*... 1 1 2 1 1 6 216 52.1
ment House of Correction .... 1 1
Mass. Reformatory ..... 1 3 4
C. W. D.-C. B.** ........ 1 1
Div. Ch. Guardt ........ 2 2
$5-25 ................... 1 8 13 22
Fine $26-50 ................... 1 4 5 30 7.2
$51-200 .................. 1 2 3
TOTAL ............... 5 7 14 18 23 28 74 111 135 415 100.0
Middlesex County Training School, a truant school for boys.
** Child Welfare Department-City of Boston-city child placing division.
f State Division of Child Guardianship-State child placing division.
An examination of the dispositions from which this group ap-
pealed as related to their ages, reveals that a larger proportion in
the lower brackets appeal from the finding of delinquency, while
the upper ages appeal more often from an order of commitment. Of
the 67 appeals of those between ages eight and twelve, 44 (65.7%)
appealed from adjudication; of the 102 appeals of those aged thir-
teen and fourteen, 54 (52.9%) appealed from adjudication; of the
21 Cf. Alper, Benedict S., and Lodgen, George E., The Delinquent Child in
Pennsylvania Courts, XX Mental Hygiene No. 4, October, 1936, pp. 603, 604.
22 Ibid., p. 600.
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246 aged fifteen and sixteen who appealed, 68 (27.6%) took excep-
tion to an adjudication of delinquency. The adjudications of pa-
ternity were found one each in years fourteen, fifteen and sixteen.
Fines, also, were limited to these three upper years.
The whole system of juvenile appeals appears absurd when we
confront the picture of eight, nine, ten, and eleven year old children
appealing the action of a court that is supposed to be dealing with
them in a manner bespeaking parental understanding. Yet there
is some justification for these protests to an upper court when the
lower courts are allowed to commit children eight, nine, and ten
years old to Lyman and Lancaster; boys of fourteen to Shirley,
though the law specifies they shall be over fifteen; and boys of
fifteen to the Reformatory at Concord and the House of Correction
at Deer Island.
D. The Detention Process-Jail-Bail
Juvenile sessions for appeals are held in the Superior Court at
the discretion and call of the District Attorney for the County.
They are held, usually, four times a year-in September, December,
April and June. As much as four months may therefore elapse
before a juvenile may know the outcome of his case. The shortest
period of time that any of the cases under study had to wait was
seven days, two children waited well over a year; the average was
just under one hundred days (99.9).
Three months is a long time for a juvenile who has been found
delinquent or been ordered committed to an institution, to await the
final decree of the court. The law specifies no further supervision
by the lower court during this period, except by commitment to the
recognizance of a probation officer. It is not surprising, as will be
found in a later section,23 that 44 children (10.6%) got into further
trouble and were committed to an institution on a new offense
while their appeal was still pending.
A comparison of the length of time between appeal and dis-
position with the nature of the offense, reveals no apparent rela-
tionship. Obviously the date when children's cases shall be heard
is determined by the District Attorney's custom of calling periodic
juvenile sessions rather than by the gravity of the offense or the
need of the child for attention or treatment.
The lower court decides how it shall guarantee the appearance
23 Cf. Section F, infra.
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of the child at the appeal hearing. Several methods are available
24
-recognizance of the child or a probation officer; temporary place-
ment in care of a private agency or temporary commitment to a
public child caring agency, or jail in the case of children fourteen
or over;25 imposition of bail. 26  Table 5 shows how these various
methods are used, as related to the age of the child whose case
awaits disposition.
TABLE 5
Fome OF DETENTION PENDING APPEAL, RELATED To AGE AT TInTE OF APPEAL
Age in Years
Form of Detention 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Total %
Own Recognizance 1 2 1 1 5 1.2
Recog. of Parents* 1 1 2 1 1 2 8 1.9
Recog. of Prob. Officer 1 2 3 0.7
Hse. of Gd. Shepard** 1 1 2 0.5
Dept. Public Welfare 3 1 1 5 1.2
County Jail .......... 1 4 19 36 47 107 25.8
% Jail ............... 5.6 14.3 25.7 32.4 34.8
Bail .................. 5 7 10 14 20 24 51 72 82 285 68.7
% Bail ............... 100 100 71.4 77.8 87.0 85.7 68.9 64.9 60.7
TOTAL ............ 5 7 14 18 23 28 74 111 135 415 100.0
* One recognizance of counsel is included.
** Private institution for Catholic girls.
Over two-thirds (68.6%) were required to post bail to insure
their appearance and fully one-quarter (25.8%) were detained in
Charles Street Jail. There is revealed in this whole study no more
glaring example of the disregard of the philosophy underlying the
juvenile court law than this finding that 95% of the appeal cases
were forced to post a bond or go to jail. Only 23 cases (5.6%)
were held for hearing in any other way; 13 were allowed to go
home with no further official surveillance; the court supervised 3
cases; the facilities of social agencies were used in only 7 cases.
The remainder were compelled either to post a bond or else sur-
render their liberty and be locked up in the county jail, as if they
were felons whose disappearance would endanger the security of
the city.
A consideration of the method of detention employed for the
24 Mass. General Laws, Chapter 276, Section 35; Chapter 278, Section 18.
25 Ibid., Chapter 119, Section 67.
-6 The child is expected to put up the bail; there is no provision for commit-
ment of the child to the care of his parent in case of the child's inability to
furnish bail. (Robinson v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 401.)
JUVENILE JUSTICE 353
various age groups reveals a greater use of bail in the younger
ages, with a decrease in the upper years, and the very opposite
tendency in the temporary commitment to jail. While there were
no jail commitments in ages 8, 9, 10, or 12, we find that one eleven
year old boy was so held; this number climbs rapidly until in years
fifteen and sixteen fully one-third of the cases which are awaiting
final action are first committed to Charles Street Jail.
The offense with which a juvenile is charged in the lower
court determines not only the disposition which he shall receive,
as was seen in the preceding section, but also the form of deten-
tion by which he shall await his appeal to the upper court. The
299 more serious offenders were held in jail in 88 instances (29.4%),
19 of the 116 less serious offenders (16.4%) were so detained;
bail was met in only 65.6% of the first group and 76.7% of the latter.
As offense influences the lower court disposition, it is to be ex-
pected, in turn, that disposition will also affect determination of
the method of detention. Of 169 appeals from adjudication, 136
(80.5%) were held on bail; of 216 appeals from commitment, 122
(56.5%) were so held. Those who appealed from commitment were
held in jail in 38.4% of their number; those who appealed from
adjudication were temporarily committed to jail in one-third as
large a proportion-12.4%.
Of the 114 cases which were detained for trial, 107 were held
in Charles Street Jail for a total of 775 days. The mean average
was a little over a week (7.2 days), the median at 3 days and the
mode at one day.2 7 Fourteen children were detained'in jail over
twenty days each,28 three of them for five weeks or more. The
other seven children who were otherwise detained averaged al-
most nine weeks each (61.6 days). Of all those detained, the
27 The importance of appeals in the detention problem may be realized from
the fact that in the calendar year 1934, of 139 cases of children 16 years or younger
detained in Charles Street Jail, 31 (22.3%) were held for appeal. The average
length of time spent in jail by those held on appeal was double the average for
those otherwise detained. (From an unpublished study on file at the Massa-
chusetts Child Council, Boston.)
28 Mass. General Laws, Chapter 119, Section 67, paragraph 3, requires that
in the case of "a child so committed to jail to await examination or trial . . .
not more than twenty days shall elapse after the original commitment before
disposition of such case by the court . . . ." The first paragraph of this section
refers to children "under fourteen held for examination or trial, or to prosecute
an appeal to the superior court." The second paragraph of this same section
refers to children "fourteen years of age or over so held." Neither the second
nor the third paragraph refers to cases "held to prosecute an appeal," so that it
is debatable whether the twenty day limit set for the jail detention of children
includes appeal cases.
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average was 10.6 days. It was the lot of twenty-three children to
spend the entire time between their appeal and the Superior Court
hearing in a place of detention, twenty of them in the Charles
Street Jail-the time this group was detained averaged four weeks
(28.5 days).
The factor of age seems to enter strongly into the determina-
tion of how long a child shall be detained in jail. While the thir-
teen year olders were detained an average of 2 days, those fourteen
-were held 3.8 days, those fifteen for 8.6 days, and the sixteen year
olds an average of 8.1 days. Of the 38 girls who appealed, 27 were
required to put up bail for their appearance, 5 were held in Charles
Street Jail an average of 6 days each. One girl was held in jail
for 13 days.
All those who were temporarily committed to jail pending
hearing were compelled to be so because they lacked the influence
or money or property to enable them to meet the bail requirements.
It was shown above that of this group 20 spent the entire time in
jail pending appeal, because they were unable to post a bond.
The security demanded of this group totalled $49,200, an average
of $2,589.47 each. In one instance, $6,000 bail was asked, in two
others, $10,000.
Of the total of 107 who were held in jail, it was shown that 20
were not released during the entire time that they awaited trial.
The remaining 87 cases were released at some time before the
hearing, 68 of them upon the posting of security, 9 on their per-
sonal recognizance, 10 on the recognizance of a Superior Court
Probation Officer. An average bail of $511.93 was secured from
this group.
Adding the 285 cases which were held on bail after appeal
had been taken, to the 87 who were released from jail upon the
posting of a bail bond, personal recognizance or the recognizance
of a probation officer, there results a total of 372 cases (89.7%)
who were required at some time in the detention period to guar-
antee their appearance by a security. While no such exorbitant
sums were posted by this group as were demanded of the cases
which were held in jail for the total period in default, it was never-
theless found that two cases put up $2,500, three put up $2,000,
and 22 put up sums ranging from $1,000 to $2,000. A total of $125,184
bail was secured from this group, an average of $335.61 each.29
"9 The amount stated here would of course be much higher if it were to
include the bail demanded instead of what was finally posted.
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A consideration of the amount of bail posted as related to the
age of the child, reveals that those from ages 8 to 10 averaged
$126.23; those aged 11 to 13 averaged $209.97; those from years
13 to 16 averaged $377.78. Offense is also an important criterion in
the determination of the size of the bond to be posted-sex offenders
average a bond of $506.58; those who have committed the more
serious property offenses average a bail of $459.42; whereas those
accused of assault and battery put up an average of $113.73, and
violators of city and town ordinances were asked an average of
$120.83. Seriousness of offense as a determinant of how the juvenile
proceeds to defend himself is shown in the fact that those repre-
sented by counsel average a bail bond one hundred dollars higher
than those not so represented. The courts which set the amount
to be posted vary also in the amounts they ask-while the East
Boston Court averages the lowest with $182.13, the Brighton Court
sets an average figure almost three times as great-522.22.
E. Hearing in the Superior Court-The District Attorney-Plea-
Jury
The law requires the lower court to supply to the Superior
Court a report of its investigation of the appellant.30 A search of
the Superior Court files revealed that the Boston Juvenile Court
was the only one of the nine which heeded this provision. The
Superior Court is furnished with a brief investigation made by its
probation office, but this is not the equivalent of a complete record
of the lower court's experience.3 1 The case may thus properly
be said to be considered de novo by the Superior Court, with no
reliance on the results of the treatment by the original court.
The preceding section described the District Attorney's tradi-
tion of setting the four dates a year on which juvenile sessions
shall be called. On the day that the juvenile session is held, the
juveniles, with their parents, counsel, and such witnesses for both
sides as have been called, wait outside in the corridors and mingle
with the crowds that are always in attendance at the daily criminal
sessions of the Superior Court. One by one the cases are called
before the District Attorney, and he there goes over them before
30 Mass. General Laws, Chapter 119, Section 56.
31 "There is also no reason why Superior Court judges should not rely on
the reports of the district court probation officers instead of sending out their
own probation officers to duplicate work already done." Warner, S. B. and
Cabot, H. B., Judges and Law Reform, Harvard Law School Survey of Crime
in Boston, Vol. IV, Cambridge, 1936, p. 58.
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they go in to the Judge. There is no attempt on the part of any
court officer to give the child an idea of what step in his hearing
this appearance represents. There is evident throughout the re-
view of the case an attempt to secure an admission of culpability
from the child, and the District Attorney makes the first offer
in this bargaining process by assuring greater leniency in final dis-
position by the Judge if such an admission is forthcoming. All
the cases called for that day are thus reviewed, with the exception
of those which have been nol prossed. Since 1922 the District
Attorneys of Massachusetts have been required to file with their
not pros orders a memorandum stating their reasons for not con-
tinuing the case. 2  Of 29 juveniles nol prossed, such memoranda
were found in 25 cases.
In three instances where the nol pros memorandum carried
the statement "This defendant has a good record," or "The de-
fendant has a probation record, but only a slight one," serious prior
records were obtained from the Board of Probation.
The exercise of the not pros power has steadily diminished
over the five year period here studied,3 3 so that there is hope that
the law compelling dispositions of juvenile appeal cases by direct
order of the court only,34 is finally being heeded. Since juvenile
cases should, by their nature, be heard on the civil rather than on
the criminal side of the court, it seems unnecessary that the func-
tion of prosecutor be exercised through nolle prosequi or in any
other manner.
The District Attorney influences the disposition of cases not
only by his exercise of the not pros power, but also through the
recommendations which he makes and the memoranda he passes
to the Judge or to his own assistant in the course of the hearing.3 5
Several such written notes were found in an examination of the
court papers. These tell in the crisp staccato language of the
court and criminal process the part which the District Attorney
plays, and the attitude which motivates his decisions.
It is obvious from these memoranda that the district attorney
acts as representative of both the defense and the prosecution-he
does not choose to offer evidence through his office when such
32 Mass. General Laws, Chapter 277, Section 70A.
33 Cf. Section F, infra.
34 Mass. General Laws, Chap. 119, Sec. 56. Cf. Section A, supra.
35 Ibid., Chapter 277, Section 70B, requires the District Attorney or his as-
sistant to accompany all motions for filing cases with a written statement of the
reasons for such disposition.
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evidence is lacking or likely to be insufficient; he suggests who shall
go on trial; he sums up the condition or offense of the child on
simple superficial grounds and recommends action by the court on
the basis of his elementary findings. One memorandum displays
one of the greatest weaknesses in the present juvenile procedure-
the overlapping jurisdiction of the nine courts in the county, which
makes possible the absurd condition of a boy's being on probation
for three different offenses in three separate courts in the county
at the same time."6
If his case is not nol prossed, the juvenile makes his plea when
he enters the Superior Court. In so far as can be discovered, there
is little difference between the handling of a juvenile and an adult
in this respect. It was found that 270 cases (65.1%) pleaded
guilty,s 7 55 (13.3%) pleaded not guilty, 89 (21.4%) had no plea
recorded, 1 pleaded "nolo contendere." An opportunity is allowed
the juvenile, however, to change his plea, as may be seen from the
following entry in one court record: "Defendant's oral motion to
retract plea of guilty allowed. Defendant pleads not guilty"; and
he is allowed to be selective in his pleading, as in the case where
it is seen that a child "Pleads guilty to so much as charges larceny."
Before the juvenile is asked to plead, he is given an oppor-
tunity to decide whether he shall be tried by jury or whether he
shall take his case directly before the judge.38 Thirty cases (7.2%)
stood by their right to a jury trial, the remaining 385 were disposed
of by a direct hearing before the judge or by a nol pros from the
district attorney. Signed waivers of the right to a jury trial were
found in 59 cases (14.2%), and there is one record which reads
"Jury trial waived by father." One juvenile stood trial before
a jury at the age of 11 years 5 months, another at 12 years 1 month;
the average age of the thirty who appeared before a jury was
36 "In an appreciable proportion of the cases . . . the delinquent was on
sentence from some other tribunal at the time of appearance of his case in the
Boston Juvenile Court. . . . This is one of the major obstacles to adequate
action." Glueck, Sheldon and Eleanor T., One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents,
Hfarvard Law School Survey of Crime in Boston. Vol. I, Cambridge, 1934, p. 134.
37 "The basic reason in law for allowing an appeal in any case is to meet
the constitutional requirement of trial by jury. In so far as an appeal is taken
for that purpose, there can be no criticism. But the exceedingly small number
of re-trials and the fact that in 60% of appealed cases guilt is admitted, force
the conclusion, which accords with the actual experience of all district judges,
that in the vast majority of cases the appeal is not to get a jury trial, but to
escape a sentence." Bolster, Wilfred, Criminal Appeals, 7 Mass. L. Q. (August,
1922), p. 21.
38 Mass. General Laws, Chapter 263, Section 6 allows any defendant in the
Superior Court in a criminal case to elect to waive a jury trial.
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15 years 2 months, just 6 months older than the average age of the
total group.
In addition to these thirty cases which were presented before a
jury, there were six instances discovered where the juvenile de-
cided to throw himself upon the court for disposition upon a change
of plea. To quote from one case, "Court is declared a juvenile
session. Trial. After jury impanelled and sworn and part of testi-
mony introduced, defendant pleaded guilty and issue was with-
drawn from the jury." No greater travesty on the procedure which
should properly govern a juvenile hearing can be imagined. Here
in one brief court entry are expressed the contradictions and ab-
surdities which are supposed to make possible the transformation
of an adult court into a juvenile session simply by the pronounce-
ment of the magical words. The court is left to go on with an
adult criminal procedure, jury trial and all, serene in the conviction
that it is adhering to the law because a formula has been
pronounced.
Cases which are not tried before a jury are disposed of by the
Superior Court Judge sitting in the regular Criminal Session.
This final step in the juvenile appeal process takes place in a small
chamber off the main court room. Children waiting for the Judge
take seats among the spectators during the criminal trial that is
going on, or mix with crowds outside. During one session the
Judge called a recess during the criminal trial at which he was
presiding, and adjourned to a side room where, in forty minutes,
he disposed of the cases of ten juvenile appellants. This done, he
mounted his bench and the criminal trial resumed.
F. Final Disposition-Offense-Sex-Age-Court-Counsel--
Judge
Section C inquired into the action of the lower court and
showed how offense, age and sex were related to the appealed
disposition. It will be interesting to examine the action of the
upper court in the light of these same criteria, but first comparison
should be made of the upper and lower court dispositions. This
is the purpose of Table 6.
Following the diagonal through the table from left to right,
there results a total of only 16 cases (3.9%) where the disposition
in the Superior Court is precisely the same as the disposition in
the lower court. Deducting from the total dispositions the 44 cases













~2 12 a~ *' 0 . -
U . . " ~ . U~ ID C'3 e




















Sus Sent to Inst 11
Total ......... 166

















16 1 1 29
1 1 1 70
121 21 6 1 4 1
29.2 5.1 1.4 0.2 1.0 0.2
1 44 10.6
1 2 72 17.4
1 2 2 159 38.3
18 4.3
2 22 5 3 415 100.0
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therefore not again be adjudicated" the percentage of identical
dispositions rises to 4.3%. The Superior Court reversed the judg-
ment of the lower court in 95.7% of the cases under examination.
0
A present Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
once said "The system of appeals reminds one of the habit of small
3 These 44 cases will for this reason be omitted from further consideration in
the remainder of this section. Cf. Section C. supra.
-to "If the sentencing habits of the superior court have been right, the district
courts have been habitually over-sentencing. If the district courts have been
right, the superior court has been habitually under-sentencing. Only public
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boys, who, after trying some dispute by the toss of a coin, and
losing the toss, cry 'Twice out of three!'- 4 1  When these same
"small boys" find that they stand to profit from an appeal, their
refusal to abide by the decision of the lower court takes on in-
creased significance. The fact is that they do so stand to profit-
349 of 371 (94.1%) gained by appeal, 6 (1.6%) lost by appeal, and
16 (4.3%) neither gained nor lost. This compares with the result
of 709 adult criminal appeals to the Suffolk Superior Court in
certain months of 1929, as follows: 86.7% gained by appeal, 3.2%
lost by appeal and 10.1% neither gained nor lost.
4 2
While the Superior Court made its own investigation of the
appeal cases before the hearing, it is difficult to believe, from a
reading of them, that sufficient information was thus revealed to
account for the overwhelming number of judgments which were
not affirmed. A reading of these investigations shows them to be
too brief to supply the court with any strikingly new data on the
child. If the lower courts had followed the legal requirement of
sending up the results of their own experience with the case, per-
haps so large a number of their dispositions would not have been
set aside. '4 3 It is likely that during the hearing, the Court may have
been apprised of a change in circumstances which warranted a
policy of greater leniency than that displayed by the lower court.
It is more likely that the Judges of the Superior Court, accustomed
to dealing with adults and the more serious criminal charges, looked
lightly upon the offenses committed by these juveniles. The lower
courts cannot help but suffer from such a reversal of their decisions;
they certainly would not tolerate so wasteful and unnecessary a
duplication in the conduct of their civil cases.
44
Section C revealed that in the lower court two-fifths (40.7%)
of the appeals were from adjudication, over one-half (52.1%) from
commitment, and less than one-tenth (7.2%) from fine. The Su-
perior Court filed, nol prossed or discharged (not delinquent) al-
most one-half (46.1%); committed only 20 cases (5.4%) and fined 3
(0.8%). They placed on probation 177 cases (47.7%) ; 159 on straight
probation and 18 with suspended sentences. The leniency and
41 Lummus, Henry T., The Failure of the Appeal System, Boston, Massachu-
setts Prison Association, 1909, p. 14.
42 Warner and Cabot, op. cit., p. 47.
43 Cf. Section E, supra.
44 Of 428 appeals from all courts in Massachusetts on the civil side, to the full
bench of the Supreme Judicial Court for the calendar year 1934, 347 decisions
(81.1%) were affirmed. (From an unpublished study on file with the Lawyers'
Brief and Publishing Company, Boston.)
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use of a greater variety of treatment methods displayed by the
upper court may be brought out more strongly by the following
comparisons: of the 169 adjudications in the lower court, 94
(55.6%) were filed or discharged; of 30 fined by the lower court,
3 (10.0%) were again fined; of 216 commitments in the lower court,
20 (9.3%) only were again committed. It was noted above 5 that
of all the juvenile commitment orders made by the lower courts
over a five year period, one in three was appealed. Here it is seen
that of these appeals, only one in ten is affirmed. A lower court
judge, earnest in his desire to commit those whom study shows
to require it, is bound to be discouraged by the high rate of ap-
peals from commitment, and to be rendered more cautious in his
use of commitment orders when he learns that nine-tenths of these
appeals are successful. The juvenile who thus evades a period of
institutionalization is bound by the same token to lose respect for
the juvenile process that makes escape possible.
Table 3 pointed out a close relationship between gravity of
offense and seriousness of disposition in the lower court--of 299
of the more serious offenses (breaking and entering, violation of
motor vehicle laws, larceny and larceny of auto, sex offenses) 176
(58.9%) were appealed from commitment. The Superior Court
committed 19 of these 299 serious offenders (6.4%) to institutions.
Only 20 commitments in all were made by the Superior Court and
19 of these were for the more serious offenses. It may be deduced,
then, that the Superior Court acts in accordance with the same
principle as the lower court and punishes the more serious vio-
lators more seriously, though here, as in all its dispositions, it acts
more leniently.
It was further noted in Table 3 that all 9 school offenders were
committed by the lower court-the Superior Court committed only
1 and divided disposition of the other 8 cases evenly between filing
and probation. The lower court committed 5 of the 6 "stubborn
children" to Lancaster; the upper court divided its disposition of
these 6 cases evenly between probation and discharge. Of the
total of 100 miscellaneous offenses, all milder in their implication
(disorderly conduct, violation of city ordinances, gaming, trespass,
drunkenness, runaway, violation of liquor and drug laws) the
lower court committed 29 and fined 17. The Superior Court dis-
charged 77 of these minor offenses, and placed 21 on probation.
-15 Cf. Section B, supra.
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Not a single one of this group of 100 was fined or committed to an
institution by the upper court.
Any comparison of the upper and lower court dispositions as
related to the sex of the appellant is made difficult by the paucity
of cases in the sample of girls. The Superior Court committed only
one girl to Lancaster to 21 such commitments in the lower court;
19 boys were committed to institutions as against 192 appeals from
commitment. The lower court fined 1 girl and 29 boys; the upper
court fined no girls and only 3 boys. For the 21 girls committed to
Lancaster by the lower courts,, the Superior Court placed an equal
number of girls on probation. Probation was meted out to 156 boys,
18 of them carrying suspended sentences, while no girls were given
suspended sentences. Twelve girls out of 38 (31.6%) were dis-
charged by nol pros, filing or a finding of not delinquent, 158 boys
out of 377 (41.9%) experienced a similar decision.
An examination of the upper court decisions by age4 1 furnishes
further testimony for the finding previously made that its decisions
are based on the same criteria as those of the lower court except
that the means employed are more varied, and the tone is, through-
out, more mild. The 30 fines in the lower court were imposed only
on those fourteen, fifteen and sixteen years of age; the 3 fines in
the Superior Court were imposed only on those sixteen. The
lower courts committed boys eight, nine and ten to Lyman; the
committing age of the Superior Court started at thirteen years.
Table 7 shows, in abbreviated fashion, the manner in which de-
cisions in the Superior Court, like those in the lower courts, are
related to the age of the child.
TABLE 7
DISPOSMON* IN THE SuPEsioR COURT, RELATED TO AGE
Disposition
File or Not
Age Group Delinquent Nol Pros Commitment Probation Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
8 to 11 .............. 29 72.5 .. .. .. .. 11 27.5 40 100.0
12 to 14 ............. 51 45.2 1 0.9 4 3.5 57 50A 113 100.0
15 and 16 ........... 62 28.8 28 13.0 16 7.4 109 50.8 215 100.0
Total .......... 142 38.6 29 7.9 20 5.4 177 48.1 368** 100.0
* This table does not include 3 fines, and 44 cases filed because commitment to
an institution intervened between appeal and hearing. Cf. note 39, supra.
** Percentages in this table are computed on the basis of this total.
46 As ages were taken as of the date of appeal, and an average of 100 days
(99.9) intervened between appeal and hearing, the group was a little more than
three months older at time of final disposition.
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Discharges are highest in the ages 8 to 11 with 72.5%, lower
in ages 12 to 14 with 45.2%, and lowest in years 15 and 16 with
28.8%. Commitments make up 3.5% of the middle age group and
7.4% in the highest. The proportion placed on probation in the
two upper age groups is almost twice that of the younger years.
The probation cases in ages 8 to 11 were all for a term of one year;
of the probation cases in ages 12 to 14, 8 were for more than a
year; of the probation cases in ages 15 and 16, 25 were for more
than a year, 6 of them for terms of 4, 5, or 6 years. The adult
instrument of nol pros is used almost exclusively in the oldest age
group.
An examination of the upper court dispositions as related to
the court in which the appeal originated, discloses little perceptible
discrimination. The percentage of discharges runs about the same
for all courts, except that no nol prosses are recorded for the
Boston Juvenile or the Brighton Court and no commitments were
ordered against any of the cases which arose in the East Boston
Court.
The first element in the comparison between the dispositions
in the Superior Court and the detention process is the weight
given to the length of time between appeal and hearing. No re-
lationship is discoverable, however-the various forms of disposi-
tions are found scattered evenly across the varying periods of time
which these appeal cases had to wait before the upper court
hearing.
The group originally admitted to bail by the lower court was
found to be committed by the Superior Court in 4.2% of its cases,
those who were first temporarily consigned to jail were committed
by the Superior Court in almost twice as high a proportion-7.5%.
It may be argued that jail detention was the result of inability to
raise a stipulated sum, but it has been shown above, in the twenty
cases where the amount of bail was known, that the amount de-
manded of the jailed group was much higher than that demanded
of those who went free.47 No institutional commitments whatsoever
were made by the upper court of those cases which had been held
on recognizance, or in the custody of a public or private agency,
which further strengthens the finding that the Superior Court is
guided in its decisions by its conception of the potential or actual
degree of anti-social conduct of the juvenile appellants who come
before it.
47 Cf. Section D, supra.
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Those represented by counsel fare no better in the Superior
Court than those without legal aid. Of the 144 cases which were
represented, 64 (44.4%) were discharged, 8 (5.6%) were com-
mitted and 72 (50.0%) were placed on probation. For those not
represented, the corresponding figures are 109 (48.0%) discharged,
12 (5.3%) committed, and 106 (46.7%) placed on probation.
There is evidently as much skill necessary for juveniles as
for adults in the bargaining process of the .plea-while only 59
of the 235 who pleaded "delinquent" (25.1%) were discharged,
39 of 52 who pleaded "not delinquent" (75.0%) were likewise
discharged. The "delinquent" group is, moreover, subjected to
further supervision by the court more frequently, as it is found
that 162 of them (68.9%) were placed on probation compared to
6 of those who pleaded "not delinquent" (11.5%). Pleading "not
delinquent" is, despite these findings, a risky venture, because the
commitment rate is 11.5% for this group as against 5.1% for those
who admitted their "delinquent" condition.
When a child, or his attorney, insists on a trial by jury,48 he is
not likely to come off so lightly as might be expected from the find-
ing that of 30 who stood trial, 19 (63.3%) were found not delin-
quent, while of 341 who were heard without jury, 153 (44.9%)
were discharged. The commitment picture shows that of 30 who
stood trial, 6 (20.0%) were committed to an institution; of 341
who were not heard by a jury, only 14 (4.1%) were committed.
During the five year period covered by this study, no less than
nineteen Judges sat on the cases of 384 juveniles.49 Judge "A"
heard 180 cases (46.9%), Judge "B" heard 93 cases (24.2%), Judge
"C" 44 cases (11.5%), Judge "D" 18 cases (4.7%) and Judge "E"
17 cases (4.4%). The other 14 Judges handled 32 cases (8.3%) an
average of slightly over 2 cases each. The procedure is certainly
inefficient that allows nineteen Judges to rotate on the bench in
this manner instead of assigning one of their number exclusively
to juvenile cases. Where Superior Court hearings of juvenile ap-
peals are set for only four sessions a year, this should work no
hardship, especially to a Judge trained and selected for this work.
It is not surprising to find that the five Judges who heard 91.7%
of the appeals differed radically in their dispositions. Table 8
shows how these dispositions are distributed.
4 Cf. note 38, supra.
49 This figure does not include 29 nol prosses and 2 cases where the name of
the judge was not ascertained.
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TABLE 8
VARIATIONS IN DISPOSITION PRACTICE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES
Disposition
Judge Discharge Probation Commitment Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
"A" .............................. 55 36.4 88 58.3 8 5.3 151 100.0
"B" .............................. 40 50.6 36 45.6 3 3.8 79 100.0
"C". ............................. 30 71.4 10 23.8 2 4.8 42 100.0
"D" .............................. 2 11.1 15 83.3 1 5.6 18 100.0
. .............................. 2 12.5 14 87.5 .. .. 16 100.0
Total ........................ 129 42.2 163 53.2 14 4.6 306* 100.0
*This figure does not include 43 cases which were filed because they had
already been committed to an institution and 3 cases which were fined.
The dissimilarity in disposition practice is evident without
further description. It remains to point out that of the 9 cases
heard by Judge "F," 3 were committed, while Judge "G" committed
both of the cases over which he presided.
The most important finding revealed by an examination of the
disposition policy of the Superior Court over the five year period
1931-1935, inclusive, may be described as an increasing reluctance
on the part of the court to release cases from supervision. Nol
prosses were found to number 12 in 1931, 10 in 1932, 5 in 1933, 2
in 1934, and none in 1935. The percentage of those filed or found
not delinquent was 51.7% in 1931, 37.5% in 1932, 37.3% in 1933,
20.0% in 1934, and 37.2% in 1935. The use of probation shows the
following percentages over the same years: 33.0%, 42.1%, 50.7%,
61.8%, 59.0%.
A final consideration makes it impossible to conclude this
section on the hopeful note that the administration of the juvenile
process is becoming each year more strongly conscious of the re-
sponsibility it owes toward the juveniles who come before it. The
records of the Charles Street Jail show that 9 cases were detained
a total of 39 days, an average of 43 days each, after the appeal
had been heard and the commitment order had been imposed.
There seems to be no good reason why a juvenile who has been
ordered to an institution should spend 5 or 6 or 12 days waiting
in the county jail for "safe keep" before delivery to the officer
who will transport him. The responsibility for failure to transport
juveniles devolves properly uporn the sheriff to whom the mittimus
is addressed. It would seem that the court should be sufficiently
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interested in the juvenile who is to go to an institution to require
that he be taken there at once.
Conclusion
The net effect of this study is a revelation of complete dis-
continuity in what should be a coherent and unified process for deal-
ing with errant children. The attitude of the lower courts, the
detention process with its evils of jail commitment and imposition
of high amounts of bail, the procedural steps in the upper court
paralleling the adult criminal process, should properly have no place
in the design and structure of an enlightened childien's tribunal.
Even if this study had discovered that the lower courts adhere
to the best accepted juvenile practice, their efforts would be set
at naught by the disabling process of appeal, and the unspecialized
manner in which appeals are handled in the upper court.
But the lower courts are not above reproach. The juvenile
sessions cannot perform their proper duty toward the juveniles
who come before them when as high as one-fifth of their decisions
are appealed. Such courts are bound to lose prestige in the eyes
of both the child offender and his parent. The errors shown in
their treatment of children should be subject to review so long as
they do not devote full time and specialized attention to juvenile
cases, apart from the duties of the adult criminal and civil calendar.
The Superior Court contributes toward the present discon-
tinuity by acting as if their consideration of the case were entirely
independent of the lower court's experience. Because they are
neither specialized nor equipped for juvenile work, their responsi-
bility is realized as only a part-time casual performance, instead
of a continuing inclusive interest in all the features of the juvenile
process. The need is evident for one children's court for Suffolk
County, original, superior and final in its jurisdiction, to take the
place of eight juvenile sessions and one specialized juvenile court,
themselves varying and conflicting in their treatment of children.
Only in this way can the evil of juvenile appeals be reduced.
Even with one juvenile court organized on a county-wide
basis, operating under the best imaginable children's court pro-
cedure, allowance should be made for the occasional case where
a serious error or miscarriage of justice might occur. For such an
eventuality, provision should be made for appeals on a question
of law or upon the ground of abuse of discretion. Such appeals
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should be allowed only from adjudication, and not from disposition,
providing for the return of the child to the jurisdiction of the
children's court if the adjudication of delinquency or waywardness
is affirmed. Such appeals from adjudication should be addressed,
either to the Supreme Judicial Court or, preferably, to a group of
juvenile court judges not including the judge who made the orig-
inal adjudication.
This study undertook to discover how juvenile appeals are
handled in Suffolk County. Its results indict the present system.
More important, its findings, like a prism, reveal from this single
beam a multitude of concomitant and related evils. Further reform
in the field of appeals alone will not be a sufficient remedy. The
mechanism has been repaired too often. Regardless of minor im-
provements, the courts continue to err drastically in their attempt
to carry out the provisions of an inconsistent set of statutes and of
agencies. The only constructive effort that can possibly be suc-
cessful now is one which shall first enunciate fundamental prin-
ciples and then rear a structure of law and administration based
firmly upon them.
